The purpose of this paper is to explore various views regarding the mind-body problem or the problem of consciousness. 

I’ll start with the outline and interpretation of the major contending positions as categorized into 6 types of reductive or materialists and non-reductive views by David Chalmers (2002, 245-271) and will focus on some views that I find more plausible so not all positions are given the same space and consideration, but presented for the sake of comparison.

What we are concerned with here is the hard problem of consciousness which relates to the very existence of consciousness and conscious phenomena vis-à-vis physical phenomena and the “natural” world; the how and why of its existence in the first place, which is distinguished from the easy problem as it relates to the cognitive functions and different aspects of consciousness involved in our actions and behaviors.  In other words, how do our subjective states and experiences, which include emotions, thoughts, perceptions and sensations, viz. all mental states arise from physical brain processes?  Why do neural processes and activities in the brain give rise to subjective experiences in the first place?  Chalmers holds the view that in so far as the easy problem and the function and structure of consciousness are concerned, neuroscience and science in general should be able to answer eventually.  But the current scientific methods are not sufficient to address the hard problem because any theory or discovery of science that tells us about how our brain functions as well as our cognitive capacities and structure, still does not answer the question of how these physical mechanisms and processes give rise to the subjective states of our experiences.

Three main arguments against materialism presented are the explanatory, conceivability and the knowledge argument.  1) The explanatory argument identifies the gap between physical functions and processes and mental, subjective states.  Chalmers makes an important distinction in that he separates “structure” and “function” from the content and the very substance of consciousness as he argues that the mechanical means can explain the function and structure, but not the content of our experiences and that is why science and the materialist reductionist views are missing the point.  hey think that just capturing and explaining these features could account for the essence of our subjective states. Therefore, if physicalism can only explain the structure and function, or its mechanism, it is not explaining consciousness itself and the gap remains. 

Thus the reductive materialist argument and view fails to account for consciousness, and if we go further in saying that because there cannot be a physical account, it must not be physical, the foundation of physicalism or materialism has to crumble.  2) The second argument used against materialism is the conceivability argument. The example often used for this is the zombie argument, i.e., if it’s conceivable to have systems or zombies or worlds where consciousness was missing, consequently so would our subjective experiences of consciousness, but not the function or the physical structure and features which would be the same as ours. The conceivability here relies on the idea that, such a case is possible in other worlds and by virtue of it being conceivable, it’s assumed to be metaphysically possible.  So if the zombies are like humans physically and yet lack the mental states, it means that consciousness is not physical, but an added element.  Although this seems like a rather straightforward argument, I think a materialist could argue that they are not exactly identical to us physically, even though they may appear to be, or that perhaps conceivability is not a strong and sound foundation for metaphysics as anything can be conceivable, with which I sympathize.  I do not find conceivability particularly useful across the board as a good basis for metaphysical possibility even if is technically so, since it can come at the expense of meaning and common-sense as it relates to our world, leaving them completely at the mercy of our imagination. 3) The third argument used against materialism is the knowledge argument, which I won’t discuss as it has been covered in previous papers.  As we saw, all these three arguments point to an epistemic discrepancy between the physical and mental phenomena that cannot be crossed by physicalists’ accounts alone.

The more detailed positions are categorized as types A to F between the reductive and non-reductive views. The materialistic counter-arguments against the gap is generally to either deny it (Type A), to define it as an epistemic issue rather an ontological one (Type B), or admit that there is a gap, but one which will be resolved by science (Type C).  Type A materialism sees epistemic gap as an illusion or fallacy by reducing consciousness to its cognitive and functional aspects and denying the experiential aspect.  This explains away the hard problem by identifying consciousness as very complex and involved functions, but nothing more, which one could regard as basically an eliminativist view. Chalmers appropriately points out that counterintuitive aspect of this stand, which would require a strong argument to back it up. And simply trying to appeal to dualism as an untenable alternative would not make a strong argument. 

Type B materialists argue that Zombies may be conceivable, but not possible metaphysically. They hold the phenomenal state to be physical as water is H20. Their basic argument is that there might be differences in concept and meaning between the physical and the phenomenal, e.g., water might be a different concept than H20, but they refer to the same thing in the world, which is a posteriori determined. So while there might be an epistemic gap, there is not an ontological one. This undermines conceivability in a Kripkean fashion that does not indicate possibility. Here, Chalmers does not think that the analogy holds since consciousness is different and the epistemic gap between them are not similar. We cannot have a world that is physically identical and yet not have water. Perhaps one could use Kripke’s (Chalmers 2002, 329-334) pain argument here, that the direct aspect of certain mental states and consciousness such as feelings and sensations could not be reduced to anything that excludes their qualitative essence and remain the same. Pain could cease to be what it is if it is not experienced and felt as pain; i.e., it cannot be separated from its subjective experience. So when it comes to the phenomenal aspects of our consciousness, the appearance is the essence or rather it is the subjective experience itself and therefore irreducible.

Type C materialism holds that there is a gap, but it can be closed, which science will show in the future.  He (Chalmers) regards this type as basically falling under type A.  Because it assumes that science will be able to explain, but further explanation by science would involve functions and structures and other mechanical processes, which is more of the same and so we’re left with the same problem as type A. 

Now the alternative to materialistic positions are the non-reductive views of Type D through F. These include dualist interactionism (Type D), epiphenomenalism (Type E) and the monist protophenomenalism (Type F).  Type D does not take “causal closure” into account or perceive it as an unresolvable problem and leaves room for mental efficacy and causal roles. Type-E does not give mental states any causal roles and Type F, though supports a causal closure, also allows for interaction and efficacy of mental phenomena because it sees it as part of the intrinsic nature of the physical world.

Type-D Dualism also called interactionism regards the mental states to be non-physical and yet allows for the interaction of the mental phenomenal and the physical, without accounting for the causally closed network as the phenomenal can affect the physical and vice versa.  It’s basically Descartes’ substance dualism with separate physical and mental entities that interact and effect each other, and similar to property dualism, which is based on one substance but two distinct properties that affect each other. If the objection is the causal link and interaction between the physical and phenomenal, one could point to Humean lack of causal determinacy and explain Newtonian gravity as a fundamental force of nature without a causal link. The biggest objection to this view is that any mental effect would violate the principle of conservation of energy in a closed system.  He responds to this objection by saying that there may not be any experimental evidence, but also no contrary evidence to disprove it. Another way he counters this argument is that there are four forces so far known by physics and there is no reason to assume there should not or cannot be an additional force. (+yes) Although he concedes the great process involved in such a task, not to mention the implications regarding the fundamental transformation in the laws of physics that it implies, there is no reason it cannot be. He also points to quantum mechanics as one way to account for this interaction. One promising feature of quantum physics in this regard is the effect of the observer and measurement in the wave-function collapse. The collapse phenomenon – though is one interpretation – could create some opening for the phenomenal and mental interaction to occur. However, another alternative theory that does not include the wave-function collapse and the indeterministic view as suggested by Bohm (1951), (which will be discussed in a later section) depicts a view that introduces other strange characteristics of quantum mechanics such as non-locality and quantum entanglement, which in their own way might create a different opening for mind-matter interaction.  Admittedly while the current laws of physics do not exclude the possibility of interactionism, a lot more work needs to be done before the process is understood and explained.

Type E Dualism or epiphenomenalism has been covered to some degree previously and will not be discussed further. However, not reducing consciousness to mere physical phenomena does not preclude it from being causally inert, which is the most counterintuitive, non-reductive view and the only reason for it seems to be to avoid the physical compatibility controversy. 

Type F dualism, also known as “protophenomenal” relies on “intrinsic properties” of the physical – similar to categorical bases of dispositions – which are more fundamental than the physical properties of things. This view seems to have originated with Bertrand Russell who proposed that consciousness is the ground for the dispositional properties of physical objects; that physics only tells us about the structure and inter-relations of physical entities such as quarks and mass, i.e., their dispositions, but not about their inner nature. And a complete view of physics would include the underlying basis of these structures and interactions, which has to be grounded on some categorical basis. The categorical basis of these dispositions could be the inner nature of these entities, i.e., the phenomenal or protophenomenal properties that are part of the very constituents of the intrinsic properties of the physical structure that form reality. This view shows no conflict with causal closure as it merely adds an intrinsic property to the physical objects and there are two distinct properties that account for the physical and the phenomenal aspect.  So the physical structure remains intact, only complemented with an intrinsic nature, which ties the phenomenal and the physical together. The appeal of this view is the causal efficacy of consciousness and phenomenal properties and its compatibility with physical laws. It is a kind of neutral monism or panpsychism.

Although it is hard to know what those intrinsic properties are – that could be due to our lack of knowledge. One objection or concern, however, is regarding the coherency and consistency between all physical properties with their own protophenomenal properties which constitute the continuity and unity inherent in different aspects of our phenomenal experiences. Here he points out a need for a better understanding of how phenomenal properties are combined and integrated.

Chalmers (1998) categorizes different kinds of mental phenomena such as the functional, behavioral and information processing (which include integration, access and reporting) aspect of consciousness (Type I) and the feeling, sensory perception and subjective experiences (Type II). The question is why would type II be associated and linked to type I phenomena?  He states that experience is not an automatic result of the physical process because there could be the physical process without the experience and that experience may result from the physical process, but is not confined to it.   He is concerned that cognitive science and neuroscience, because of their methods of approach and means of focus can only give us information about the structure and function of certain states of consciousness, but not the experience itself, which is at the root of the hard problem. Hence the explanatory gap remains. He also makes a point (1995) about how periodically there has been addition of fundamental properties to physics such as the electromagnetic force that has changed the whole landscape and ontology of physics, and his proposal is that experience should be regarded as a fundamental feature of the world and physics. While admitting that the ontology might have to grow, it is not mystical or incompatible with science to suggest the term “naturalist dualism” for a new theory of experience that allows and counts experience as a fundamental entity (1995).

The areas that I strongly agree with Chalmers is that subjectivity cannot be sacrificed and ignored in understanding consciousness and subjective experiences, so the first person perspective cannot be left out and there is a need for more data gathering and analysis from this point of view. After all, we cannot take subjectivity out of our understanding of the subjective experience. He also raises some very important points about the need for some fundamental changes in our approach to this issue as the reductionist approach of the current scientific methods are not sufficient and geared towards addressing the hard problem and will not be able to close the “explanatory gap” as we know and define it. So the very methods of science have to be expanded and might have to go through some major revisions. But where he proposes experience as a new fundamental force in nature, I would go a step further and suggests that not only consciousness as a whole should be a fundamental force in physics, which is manifested on different levels and in different aspects – though it would require a great revision of laws of physics as we have today, it has the potential to be the underlying unifying field of all our forces that coheres and binds all others together.

One question that he often raises is ‘why’ in addition to how consciousness and experience arises as a result of the mechanical processes in the brain. I think asking the purpose and ‘why’ of things can be helpful in terms of guiding our intuition in the right direction in some ways as the purpose of something can often give a valuable clue to what we are trying to understand. It can help us ask the right and relevant questions and stay on track rather than being safe or correct within the confines of some artificial logical structure that we’ve devised, and help us weed out what might be nonsensical. 

So far, we’ve looked at some of the shortcomings of the materialist view of consciousness. Now we’ll take a look at some scientific phenomena that might give us some insight as to how the mind may interact with the body. Exciting and potentially transformative developments in the fields of theoretical physics as well as neuroscience are taking place that might bring us closer to an understanding of the forces in nature especially in relation to the role our mind plays in our life and the world.

The Quantum World 

Ever since the birth of quantum mechanics, there has been different views and interpretations on whether the indeterminacy of the quantum world has been due to an epistemological or a deeper and more unsettling unpredictability and indeterminism of reality itself. Even Einstein with his great imagination was not content about the possibility of uncertainty regarding the physical laws of nature, which led to the EPR proposal (Lange, p265) co-written by other physicists to portray quantum mechanics as incomplete. (Bohm 1951; Lange 2002, Ch. 9)

The main features and characteristics of quantum mechanics include the wave-particle duality, Heisenberg’s “uncertainty principle,” which seems to lead to the measurement problem, the wave-function collapse and the role of the observer as well as entanglement and non-locality. In the famous double-slit experiment, which has been repeated many times with other particles, particles of matter such as electrons show wave like characteristics by creating an interference pattern, even when sent one at a time, which with the addition of an observer seems to lead to the collapse of the wave-function.The uncertainty principle points highlights the fact that both the position and the momentum of the particles cannot be precisely determined, in fact the exact and more accurate measurement of one inversely affects the other variable or observable. Although interpretations have varied greatly, the results of the experiments over the years have remained consistent with the theory and the quantum realm remains a realm of probabilities than certainties of classical physics. This seems to imply a different sets of laws governing our physical universe on different scales.

The interpretation by physicist, David Bohm (1951), requires a different view of the world where the particles and the environment together make up the quantum system. He offers a different way of looking at the results that takes the electrons and particles as part of a whole where the context becomes critical. His theory does not include a wave-function collapse as he did not see the world as indeterministic, but indivisible (p166-72).

Superstring/M-theory 

Einstein spent the last years of his life looking for a unified theory that would combine the forces that were known in his time: gravity and electromagnetism.  In the last few decades, physicists have been on a quest to make his dream a reality by looking for a way to combine all the four forces known to physics (electromagnetism, weak and strong force, and gravity).  Superstring theory (also referred to as string theory with the inclusion of supersymmetry) (Randall, Ch. 13) has been the central part of this quest and in the last few decades, it has seen tumultuous years, gone through major changes and fell out of popularity for a while until it was revived by new discoveries that culminated in the M-theory or the “theory of everything” as it’s also known.  The M-theory is a combination or reconciliation of all the five different versions of string theory discovered in 1995 by Edward Witten that attempts to unify all the known forces of nature (Greene, p140).  The underlying premise is that all things in the universe – matter and energy are made of very tiny vibrating strands of strings. And though they were thought to be one-dimensional at first, discoveries of other entities such as “membranes” (Randall, Ch.3) posit the possibility of higher multi-dimensional worlds.

One of the most astounding features of this theory is the possibility of extra dimensions that are suggested by the equations, for instance, the M-theory requires 11 dimension of space-time. Another discovery, which is no less astounding in its implication, is the possible existence of “branes” (short for membranes), which are object like entities with the possibility of many extra dimensions that allow them to expand and grow into universes.  In fact, our own world/universe could be on one of these branes, which contain forces and particles and can potentially change the scope of the physical properties that exist in our world and leave myriad of possibilities open. (Randall, p51, 61)

String theory was born out of the desire to reconcile general relativity and quantum mechanics.  Another mystery that has had physicist pondering about the forces in world is the weakness of gravity compared to other forces such as electromagnetism (Randall, Ch.20).  With the possibility of branes, Lisa Randall and other physicists have come up with a theory that could explain this phenomenon, postulating that gravity might not be confined to our universe but leak from other branes to ours. Whereas as some strings are open and tied to a brane, gravitons (gravity messenger particles) are closed loops which allows them to travel between branes (Randall p148).

Although some have called the string theory a philosophy rather than a testable theory due to the difficulty in testing it, a Large Hadron Collider (LHC), a particle accelerator that smashes particles together has recently been built in Geneva that will soon be putting the theory to test and looking for evidence that would indicate the existence of strings (Randall, p189). And if sufficient evidence is found, the laws of physics might once again be revised as they have previously with relativity and quantum mechanics.  If string theory proves right, then the idea of extra dimensions becomes real and we could be left with adjacent universes next to our own.

A bit on neuroscience 

With the discovery of neuroplasticity and recent advancements in neuroimaging techniques, great progress is being made in the science of mind.  One recent discovery over the last couple of decades that has forever altered the image of the mind’s landscape is called neuroplasticity.  Neuroplasticity is the ability of the brain to rewire and restructure itself in response to experience and training.  One pioneer in the field, Richard Davidson has been conducting research in this area, specifically in relation to the effect of meditation on the brain.  The notion of brain’s plasticity in itself postulates the role of mind in its ability to not only effect, but shape the brain.  The research has involved novice and expert meditators (Tibetan monks) and the effect of various types of meditation and directed attention on short and long term brain circuitry, showing the brain to be malleable and its neural circuitry to be greatly affected by internal and external experiences. Brefczynski-Lewis et al.; Lutz A et al; Slagter, et al)

Some final views
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As the two major views of our physical world seem to clash, one may wonder if there are two sets of laws that rule and describe the different levels and realms of our universe or if there is an underlying basis that integrates both and can bring them together?  Are we left with two irreconcilable sets of laws or would reconciliation merely require a compromise of our own worldview that requires expansion?

Over the last 80 years, as physicists and laymen have pondered the mystery of the quantum world, there have been many applications, but little understanding of the process and the implications it holds for our world.  It seems strange because it shatters our conception of the world.  Some of us are more comfortable with uncertainty in life than others.  Even Einstein who seemed at home in the mysteries of the universe, was not comfortable in the quantum world where uncertainty rules.  Perhaps quantum mechanics is showing us a different view of reality, but only if we’re willing to embrace the unpredictability and insecurity that a living non-mechanical universe has to offer.

How do we define the role of the observer in the system and process of observation?  Is the observer a passive or an active participator?  It seems the quantum world shows the fallacy of taking ourselves, the subject, out of the equation with our intents, our thoughts and the magnetic field of our being as an observer as well as a participator of the very objective reality we want to define.  Would we find it plausible that the observer as an active participator would affect the environment and the dynamic quantum system, and yet our mind and intentions to not have any effect on our own internal brain processes?  The role of the observer on the quantum level can be analogous to how subtle an energy can change the outcome of a process as the effect and role of the observer (consciousness/mind) and mental states can have a very fine effect with ever more subtle energy that set offs the neurons in our brain.  The wave-function collapse can represent the world of probabilities that come into existence and manifestation with the participation and intention of the observer.

Some shortcomings of the materialist views

As Chalmers (1995) has pointed out, most philosophers either deny consciousness and the subjective phenomena, make it mysterious and beyond reach or miss it completely.  Some have made it into a mystery that will never be solved and some have completely denied it altogether and the rest oscillate and fall somewhere between these two extremes. The reductive and materialist accounts seem to eliminate the problem altogether by eliminating the mind itself as a separate viable entity. Yet there is a quality to subjective experiences that are irreducible to their physical counterparts, just as pain as described by Kripke (2002, 329-334) could not be anything besides it being experienced as such.

If mind is a distinct and different substance from the brain, how is the mind-body interaction possible, we ask?  How does our will and intention translate into physical phenomena?  Dualism is rejected on the grounds of not providing explanation for this interaction.  Perhaps the un-scientific thing to do is to close the door on something that we don’t have a good explanation for  We have evidence in our everyday world, but it does not fit our theories and concepts of what is possible.  Can asking the question why and inquiring into the purpose and sense of it all serve as a guide?  I find no incompatibility between a mental efficacy and the laws of physics, although it might be necessary for science to expand its concepts and tools if it seeks to explain it.  Just because we have no satisfactory explanations is no reason to give up on a strong intuition and good common sense.  Yet we seem to be at an impasse and perhaps it would take another shake up of our worldview through a new scientific revolution or a re-identification of our physical reality to change that.

Often the idea that the physical is the cause of the mental is taken for granted to be true. But there is no conclusive evidence that the brain causes or solely causes our mental experiences, which leaves us with more than a reasonable doubt as recent neuroimaging studies of the mind show.

And how can we know that the neural events cause our thoughts and emotions and not the other way around?  Can we be sure that the brain is not merely a mirroring of what is going on in the mind, an apparatus to ground and transmit our mental states to our bodies and the physical world?  The best science can give us at present are the neural correlates of our mental states.

One major and critical issue that comes up with mental inefficacy and the materialist view is the issue of free will.  If I were asked to carry out a very simple task of blinking my eyes, which I would instantaneously carry out as a consequence of responding to the sounds I heard, which seems a quite natural thing to do, how does my hearing the sounds translate in my brain that lead to the action being carried out, by passing my mind and translation of those sounds to have certain meaning? Without the mind, there is no translation and therefore meaning and my brain is incapable of responding to the words.  And if the mind translates the words in a way that gives them meaning, how does the meaning leads to the neural activity in my brain without the mind having any impact on my brain, in which case it would not be inefficacious? And how does one brain pattern leads to another without our subjective experiences of them playing any part in the process and not make us robots?  Would that make us more than zombies just because our brain processes would be accompanied with their subjective reflections if we were locked out of the actual process itself as observers only and not conscious participators?

Our subjective experiences help us connect and relate to the objective reality – to reflect and to interact with it with conscious awareness and free will. Some would think that gives some meaning and purpose to life.

Conclusion

I find any view that allows for the mind to have an impact in the world worth exploring.  Perhaps it’s a combination of intuition, meaning and purpose that gives it validity and makes it more plausible. Existence of anything that is completely inert does not seem to make much sense especially something as essential and prevalent as mind and consciousness, which permeate every aspect of our life and provide a background against which our very life unfolds. Type-D and Type-F are views that allow the mind to not only be part of our ironically so-called “natural” world, but also play a role in it; ironic for the fact that the description or label of the “natural” would not contain the very thing that allows us to experience and know about it.

The main argument against interactionism, however, is held to be the law of conservation of energy, which is one of the most exquisite and logical laws of our universe.  But what is the system that it applies to, i.e., what makes up our closed system and where are its boundaries?  Perhaps we say our physical system, but do we have a definite grasp of that physical world and its limits, or is it merely anything that we label and designate as “physical?”  With the possibilities of multi-dimensional branes and parallel universes and the implications of the M-theory, could we even imagine what the limits would be?  Maybe our universe is not a closed system by itself, in which case the concepts of causal closure and conservation of energy would take a different meaning and there would be energy exchange between the branes.  Even if our universe was a closed system in itself, what we consider to be physical is what our scientific tools and instruments have allowed us to know about and label as physical, which can be a narrow and limiting interpretation that rather than leading to a resolution, continues to close the door to where there might be other possibilities.

Can brain, no matter how dynamic and complex an organization and structure, account for our subjective experiences? Could mental states such as thoughts and emotions be energy states – energy states that are too subtle for our crude instruments to detect and as energy affects matter, they impact our brain and body?  Perhaps our concept of what is physical has to change and the means, methods and tools of science has to expand to detect what has yet has remained undetected.  As matter is a dense form of energy, so the mental force and energy can be much subtler form of high frequency energy. Who knows how refined and small measure of energy can send the neurons in our brains firing?  The role of mind and consciousness in the natural world does not refute our laws of physics, though it would enhance and modify them. Yet there is often an unfounded fear that evidence of anything non-physical has to refute science altogether as we know it.  Did quantum mechanics defy and replace relativity and classical physics (even with the existing contradictions) or expand our sense and conception of our world?

So our mind can affect our brains. Stranger things happen. I’m sure if we ask any theoretical physicist they’d say that the world we live in, our universe is stranger than anything we could make up or imagine. Science fiction can learn a lesson or two.

Relative to the history of man, the progress in the discovery of the fundamental forces in nature have only been made very recently. Science is on the verge of great leaps of progress and perhaps it might take another revolution in physics to clear the path for our understanding of the long-held mind-body dilemma and to finally take a giant leap forward.  At the end, it may come down to how much we’re willing to go out on a limb to embrace the truth, rather than stay fixed to our own cherished ideas that give us the illusion of security.  Sometimes the foundation has to crumple for a new structure to come into being.  Science has become a major and prominent player in resolving the puzzle of consciousness and with recent progress in physics and neuroscience, it seems more likely than ever that we might be on the verge of a fundamental paradigm shift. Our worldview has been in a constant state of flux since we found ourselves not to be the center of the universe and with new conceptions of space-time, gravity, particle-wave duality of light and matter; it’s not unreasonable to think that we might be in for yet another transformation of our worldview. That is the good thing about science; the capacity to shake us up from time to time from the illusion of our own making.

References

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Chalmers, David J.  Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford University Press, NY, 2002, 245-271.

Chalmers, David J.  The Problems of Consciousness. Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience (Advances in Neurology, Vol. 77). Lippincott-Raven Press, 1998.  Retrieved from http://consc.net/papers/montreal.html

Greene, Brian. The Elegant Universe.  First Vintage Books (a division of Random House, Inc.), NY, 2003.

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Meditators Self-induce High-amplitude Gamma Synchrony During Mental Practice. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 101: 16369–16373.

Randall, Lisa. Warped Passages Unraveling the Mysteries of the Universe’s Hidden Dimensions.  HarperCollins Publishers (Harper Perennial edition), NY, 2006.

Slagter, H. A., Lutz, A.,  Greischar, L. L., Francis, A. D., Nieuwenhuis, S., Davis, J. M. (2007).  Mental Training Affects Distribution of Limited Brain Resources.  PLoS Biology, www.plosbiology.org.