July, 2009
Structural characteristics and development strategies that made the states vulnerable to attack in Iran, Nicaragua and the Philippines
Exclusive rule
The factors that made Iran, Nicaragua and Philippines vulnerable to attack from within their borders are the creation of exclusive rule, based on the expulsion of the majority of people from the polity through repressive measures as well as the extent of economic intervention and development strategies that led to economic crises and high level of inequality. All these three states, along with extensive means of repression created a progressively exclusive and narrow polities leaving the majority of the population out of the policy making processes, in order to consolidate and centralize their power. (Parsa, p29) “Centralization of power” as identified by Charles Tilly, is the “largest single factor in the promotion of revolutions.” (p12)
The Pahlavi and Somozas families in Iran and Nicaragua respectively built their own dynasties, and Marcos in the Philippines hijacked the presidency and the constitution by undermining the democratic structures that formerly existed so that the electoral process worked as a mere façade and modified the constitution to keep himself in power long after his elected terms in office (p53-4). All three regimes can be characterized as “sultanic.” (Thompson, p4) However, with the centralization and the creation of the exclusive polities, and in order to maintain power and undermine opposition and discontent, these states eliminated and weakened their own base of support among most, if not all groups and classes in society and consequently became heavily reliant on the only two remaining possible sources of support – the military and external support, namely from United States. Hence the need to expand and strengthened their military forces with training and financial assistance, which they all received from U.S. (Parsa, p280). But this also created instability that could not be maintained for long, as it meant continuous and consistent support from outside and cohesive and solid military base, while the growing conflict and pressures led to the possibility of defection from the military or withdrawal of foreign support. These factors made the states vulnerable and susceptible to attack from within by producing antagonization and alienation of their own people in order to rule over them by force. But even with these seeds of growing discontent and conflict, there are other factors and variables that are critical to the rise and completion of a revolutionary process, including the ability of large factions and coalitions of groups and classes in the society to organize and mobilize along with the many components that it entails so that various classes and groups despite possible clashes of interests would still join to form coalitions in the struggle against the common enemy, the state.
The level of repression can be a very critical key in maintaining the rule of these governments and the degree of their vulnerability, as any decrease in the application of continuous force can create an opening for the opposition parties to gain power and momentum to strike and increase insurgency after a prolonged period of repression. Extreme repression of the moderate opposition groups can also provide an impetus for them to join the radical groups in order to gain strength and become more dominant as well as engender more hatred and resistance that awaits only its first chance of revolt. Any illegitimate force has to be maintained through extensive means or it will collapse. And despotic regimes often create and lead to radical oppositions, and as they block any mode of compromise, armed insurrection often follow (Thompson p5-6). So ultimately, their uncompromising and unyielding attitude and position leaves no alternatives but eruption of armed rebellion (p9). The results of these factors to maintain power ultimately create instability and dependency on external support and sheer military force. And the uncompromising nature of these three governments in response to all oppositions and contention left no room for other alternatives, but extreme radicalization and elimination of the regime (Parsa, p289-293). However, the nature and extent of alliances and other variables determined the form of revolutions that took place.
Though, the seeds of the revolution in Iran were sown long before the revolution actually took place in 1979, Iran’s exclusive rule and consolidation of power was achieved through the establishment of a very strong military power, boasting the fifth largest army in the world (BBC: Iran) before the revolution, as well as the ruthless repressive means of its secret agency, SAVAK and extensive military training and financial support from U.S.A. Military expansion budget consumed about one-third of the national budge in 1970s and the SAVAK personnel increased about five times as much from the early 1960s up to the time of the revolution (Parsa, p36). Strong repression and silencing of the opposition groups such as the liberal-nationalist and socialists, as well as increase in economic inequality along with mixed reception and support of Shah’s White Revolution resulted in creating more conflict (p34). And Shah’s close alliance with U.S. became perceived as that of a puppet and its agent, against the historical background and the memory and grievances remaining from the overthrow of Mosaddegh through the agency of the CIA presented the Shah as primarily an ally of the west rather than a real king to his own people. The clash of conflicts between the monarchy and Mosaddegh in the early 1950s over such issues as the monarchy’s extent of power and state control, nationalization of oil, economic inequality, civil liberties, and democratic rights, finally culminated in a coup d’état of August 16, 1953 staged by CIA to remove Mosaddegh from office, and succeeded to suppress the major opposition groups such as the National Front and the Tudeh parties (p30-1). But the continued support of the Bazaaries led to their exclusion from the polity and an imposition of the martial law in Tehran for four years after which SAVAK, the secret police, notorious for the capturing and torturing of political opponents of the regime was established in 1957 to enforce major repression against any opposition and made the Shah an absolute monarch (p35). All of this was supported, and assisted by US along with increasing financial aid (p31).
In Nicaragua, the Somoza dynasty lasted for more than four decades with the help of US providing military training and financial assistance. The dynasty of the father and his two sons was ruthlessly protected by the National Guard who acted with impunity and backing of US government (p39). In 1934, Samoza had Sandino assassinated, who was the head of the Nicaragua National Guard at the time and fought the U.S. marines until they retreated in 1933, and in 1936 installed himself as the president (Paige p102; Parsa, p37-44). And US continued financing and training the National Guard and supporting Samozas’s corrupt and illegitimate regime under the excuse of communism takeover as the alternative. Somozas rule were replete with corruption, fake elections, murder and torture of the young and the poor, with complete reliance on the National Guard and US financial support (Paige, p108; Parsa, p38). The size of the army was expanded from 2,900 in 1937 to about 8,000 by 1978. The National Guard controlled communication system, telephone, radio, postal service as well as national health care, railway and tax collection. They were kept apart from the population to facilitate exclusive control (Parsa, p39). On one occasion, the National Guard fired on a march of about 40,000 people who protested an election killing 600 people and arresting the leaders of the Communist Party (p39-40). In 1961, FSLN (Sandinista Liberation Front) was formed with the intention to remove and not merely reform the Somoza dynasty (p255, 258). In 1978, the moderates were the main opposition force, and not the FSLN ( p234). And at the time of Chamoroo’s assassination, Sandinisatas were weak with only support from the students and some of the peasantry, but not the organized labor and the urban working class, until greater repression by the state, gave them more popular support and the backing of the capitalists and the moderates. But they toned down their opposition against the bourgeoisie to attract and include the moderates and gradually broadened their base of support to include the middle class and became the main opposition group that was able to call for a general strike on Jun 3, 1979. The strike continued for six weeks and was widely coordinated among different groups and classes (p262). Finally, the repression of National Guard and “Somoza’s intransigence” led to armed conflict as the only option left to his removal from power (p291-2).
Prior democratic institutions in Philippines before Marcos became president were constructs of the US colonial rule until the declaration of the martial law in 1972 which began the creation of an exclusive rule imposed by the military and also the financial backing of U.S., using the threat of communism and oligarchy as an excuse (Aurora, p39; Thompson, p2). Intent on building a “New Society” by the imposition of the martial law also called the “one-man rule” or dictatorship (Aurora, p26-7; Thompson, p57), Marcos expanded the military while limiting the polity as part of his strategy to consolidate his power. While the immediate suspension of civil liberties were evident within hours of the martial law, with thousands of people being arrested, and the mass media being largely taken over, the politicization of the army and economy gradually unfolded over- the next 14 years (Aurora, p26-7). Thousands of presidential decrees were announced to manipulate the constitution facilitated by his knowledge about “rules of the game.” (p29) And a new constitution was ratified in 1973 with the stamp of legal approval from the Supreme Court, (p39) The martial law penetrated every area of the people’s lives, totalitarian style (Aurora, p34). It allowed him to revise the constitution, impose land reform, and promote cronyism to extreme by appointing family and close relations to high positions of power (Parsa, p50) in order to ensure loyalty and minimize the possibility of defection (p49-54). He enhanced and restructured the military by investing in higher salaries and chose his military officers based on loyalty rather than competency and in doing so undermined their autonomy (Thompson, p3). He also abolished the congress, banned demonstration and controlled the judiciary (p55) and maintained his dictatorship through “rigged referenda and elections,” and amidst growing corruption and cronyism and threats of violence, he won the second election in 1969 (Aurora, p28; Thompson, p55). Human rights violations, a great area of concern for President Carter were conveniently and mostly ignored at this time except by a small reduction in aid in 1978 (Parsa, p52). So pre-existing democratic structures were dismantled during the martial law and his concentration of power solidified with the successful and continuous backing of US (p53). A very familiar and repetitive theme present through all these revolutions. In 1981, the martial law was “officially” lifted to ease revolt and appease international pressures and scrutiny, but it was not until 1983 after the assassination of Benigno Aquino, his major opponent, that a major political mobilization was to take effect. The National Democratic Front and NPA revolutionary challengers had extensive support in the countryside as a “de facto government” providing social services such as education and sanitation, but not among the urban working class (p268). And, after Aquino’s assassination in 1983, their support widened among students, intellectuals, clergy, and even the working class. However, they were not able to win support because of perceived threats by the elite and the capitalists. And though they were able to organized general strikes, they were limited. The snap election proposed by Marcos marginalized them even more as the NPA decided to boycott the elections and the choice was narrowed to the elite candidates.
State intervention
State intervention is a monopolization of the economy by the state. Iran was the wealthiest and the most interventionist state and, Philippines the least wealthy and least interventionist, and Nicaragua falling between the two extremes (Parsa, p85). The state economic intervention and development strategies, while increasing overall economic growth initially, eventually resulted in economic inequalities (p86). It also created economic dependency on the global market, with economic growth turning to decline, devaluation of currency, rise of inequality and an economy that benefited a very few at the expense of many. While it enriched the state as well as certain elite groups, it also led to the state’s international vulnerability, which with extensive borrowing, made them reliant on even more aid. It politicized the economic processes, leaving the state as the sole target of attack and alone responsible for any economic inequality and downturns (p86). For example, Iran’s increased oil revenue experienced a decrease in 1975 due to the decline of the global market demand leading to increased interest rates and taxes. In Philippines, the International financial institutions’ dependency resulted in high debts, inflation seriously affecting people’s lives and resulting in resentments against US, multinationals and the state. The state’s dependence on US and international financial institutions resulted in debts and decrease in the standard of the living and more economic pressures for the majority of people, who saw the state as an agent of US and foreign powers furthering their interest rather than that of their own people, creating more resentment. The state intervention makes the state more susceptible to blame than if the economic problems were due to the instability or unpredictability of the market. So when the principle target of attack is the state alone, a broader coalition can be formed for the overthrow of the government. And the higher the intervention, the more likelihood of a social revolution as the state becomes the sole target of attack (55-86).
Under both internal and external pressures (from protestors and oppositions as well as US government), the Shah implemented some political changes to mitigate the increasing tensions and conflicts to no avail. He finally decided on a land reform without a lot of supporters, hoping to gain and expand his base of support among people especially the peasants, satisfy the Kennedy administration, and to emerge as a reformer. But Shah’s attempt to broad his base of support and appease tension by introducing the White Revolution package in May 1961 as a gesture of making some economic concessions did not bear the results he intended (p34). The White Revolution package entailed land reform and several other components, and increased the tensions and conflicts between the state and some classes as well as among different classes and groups. To build support Shah launched a “Seven-Year Development Plan (1955-62)” to industrialize the country, increased foreign imports and on the advice of the IMF implemented further strategies that created even more economic problems for the country (p32). The land reform was opposed by many diverse groups such as the large landowners and landed upper class who comprised 61% of the Majles in 1959 and anticipated losing a large portion of their landholdings, some clergy with large landholdings as well as the royal family (p33). The result was diminished power for the landed upper class, which undermined the alliance between the landed upper class and the monarchy, and fractured relationship between the state and the clergy. The majority of clergy was opposed to the land reform as it would impact their holdings, and some in particular were against the women’s enfranchisement as a component of the package. Khomeini rejected the whole package (p134). Land reform left out the middle and working classes, which motivated them to mobilize and take collective action (p241). Eventually “the state became the largest industrialist, banker, landlord, and trader in Iran.” (p56) About “69 percent of all financial capital was held by the state.” “It owned the entire railway and air transportation…and all communication facilities.” (p57) The development path that the government followed was that of import-substitution industrialization, “the effect of the strategy was to encourage the rise of monopolies and increased inequality.” (p58) The very critical point that struck at the effectiveness of the government was the widespread strikes by oil workers and bazaaries that halted the economy. And by the end of Dec. 1978, a council was formed from state ministries and private organizations that recognized Khomeini as the leader of the movement. On Feb. 3, 1979, parliament employees also went on strike followed by employees in the prime minister’s office. The formation and expansion of these coalitions escalated the division and breakdown in the military and finally led to Shah’s flee from the country and the downfall of the monarchy. The military’s dependence on the Shah resulted in a breakdown and collapse after his departure in January 1979 and led to the breakdown and defection of a large number of its personnel and its disintegration along with widespread protests and insurgencies forced the army to “declare neutrality” on Feb. 11, 1979 and opened the path for Khomeini’s arrival and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran (p243).
The Somoza’s government of Nicaragua treated the country as his own land and possession and used the National Guard as his own private army to enhance his “financial empire.” (Paige, p107) “Somoza’s most effective tactic was ”co-opting and rewarding, as well as intimidating potential economic and political challengers.” (Paige, p107) He often forced and manipulated people in order to get involved in their business dealings and forced some of his political opponents into business partnership and created a highly politicized economic system (p106-8). Coffee dominated the export in Nicaragua in the second half of the 19th c. until the 1950s and 1960s, when the cotton industry surpassed that of coffee in economic boon. It took first place in the economy and greatly contributed to economic development, but also inequality (p104-5). It also resulted in undermining the Somoza regime and became very advanced unlike the coffee production (p104-5). Agrarian bourgeoisie in Nicaragua played a unique and unlikely role in the revolution, whom Paige calls an “anomalous class.” (p99-100) “The Nicarguan bourgeoisie was never a ruling class.” The bourgeoisie was left to its sole interest, increasing its wealth,” so they had no political power and representation, and were excluded from the polity as were the majority of the population (p109). But in the end, by joining the FSLN, they provided a very important link in the success of the revolution. The government policies led to some economic growth, but also made the country economically dependent. Industrial developments led to dependency on the global market and vulnerable to market instabilities. With the economy being dependent on two main crop exports of coffee and cotton, the rise in oil prices negatively affected the income from the cotton exports (Parsa, p81). Nicaraguan agroexport suffered as a result of spike in oil prices and international interest rates at different periods from 1973 to 1975 and 1977 to 1981. Between 1965 to 1978, Nicaragua was left with a “negative trade balance” in billions (p81). Its growing foreign debt was the highest in Central America, with the economic decline affecting the lower income strata (p82). In 1967, the third Samoza presidency benefited the rich and Anastasio Somoza Debayle was the richest man in Central America owning one-fifth of the land and one-fourth of the industrial economy including media and transportation companies and banks. Even with the Catholic Church being the biggest landlords, Samozas surpassed the church in landownership. Finally, the earthquake in Managua killing more than 10,000 people in Dec. 1972 and thousands homeless, proved to be the catalyst for the revolutionary outcome. Soon after Somoza declared martial law lasting for 18 months, which gave him the opportunity to further enhance his own wealth and exclusive rule and widespread corruption. In the end his repression, power consolidation and embezzlement and usurpation of the earthquake’s emergency funds led to a popular revolt that brought together FSLN and the bourgeoisie for a broad coalition and popular revolt. In Sept. 1977, Somoza lifted the martial law in response to US pressure, but the assassination of Chamorro, the leader of the main opposition, in Jan. 1978 led to increased conflict and armed insurrection that finally led to his downfall and on July 19, 1979 (p37-44, 91).
Two things that set the Philippines apart from Nicaragua and Iran was its prior democratic institutions and market economy. Philippines had a market economy, but became interventionist during Marcos’s rule (Lecture). High election spending in 1969 was an example of the corruption that contributed to the decline of democratic processes and promotion of a very exclusive and wealthy polity; a CIA report indicated that one-third of the elections were bought (Parsa, p45). The development strategy that Marcos implemented was the export-led industrialization (Thompson, p3). The increased economic intervention and new policies, led to growth followed by increased national debt as well as economic inequalities, which forced the state to turn to IMF for help (Parsa, p46). A cascade of results led to very high inflation rate that made families reduce their food intake up to 71%. Yet during the economic decline, the state kept expanding its economic domain and control and became more and more interventionist, borrowing heavily from foreign agencies as well as receiving aid from US, therefore becoming more dependent on the global market (p63-4). The agroexport economy started to suffer due to its dependence on the global market and its fluctuations especially during periods of oil-price increase in 1973. Philippines ranked as having one of highest inequality in the world with seven out of ten families came from low level income segment (p74-5). And by early 1980s, about one-third of Manila’s population lived in the slums, and in 1985 – 63% of rural population lived below poverty line. Corruption was intense and wide spread, and the Marcos family accumulated great wealth (p77).
Like Nicaragua, Philippines economy depended on agroexport of coconut and its products and controlling more than 60% of the coconut oil market and raising prices, led to collapse of coconut oil market that affected one-third of the country. The second major export, sugar declined in 82, and high oil prices consumed the income from the exports. Finally difficulty with payments and high foreign debt reached $16.6 billion by 1983 (Parsa, p83). In 1984, the government had difficulty importing oil and food and the crisis caused more borrowing with IMF imposing more restrictions such as deregulation and tariff reductions which also caused rise of unemployment level and devaluation of currency (p83-4). The subsequent withdrawal of foreign investments severely affected the factories and economy and affected the banking system requiring government intervention to save it. GDP growth rate fell from 6% to -3.6% – from 1981 to 1985 within 4 years and declined by 7.3% in 1984 and 1985. In 1984, inflation rose to about 50% and the per capita income fell about 14% from 1983 to 1985. (p85) The rice program of Masagana 99 that Marcos introduced utilized petroleum-based fertilizers and pesticides, and while rising the production of rice to a level of self-sufficiency in 1978, it ended up rising the income inequality and “massive impoverishment of peasants” as a result due to oil price hikes in 1979 (Aurora, p36-7). And his land reform project was at the end called “an unqualified disaster,” with land ownerships only increasing by 2.7 percent, and the result was more poverty (p37-8). A World Bank report (1979) stated “over 40% of the rural population was below the poverty line in the mid-1970s.” (p57-8)
The similar characteristics shared by all three countries that precipitated a revolutionary movement include the formation of an exclusive polity, extensive repression with expansion and extensive use of the military apparatus against the people through the aid and support of the U.S. government, high level of corruption, and economic decline and inequality. The exclusive rule of these “sultanic” states created a bubble that put the rulers out of touch from the socio-economic reality of their people and their development strategies did not serve the interest of the population at large, but a very small minority of the elites (Parsa, p53-4, 85-6). Increased inequality reflected the blame on the state with its economic policies and interventions rather than the shortcomings of the market, and made them more vulnerable to attack. Though different development strategies were pursued, export-led industrialization in Nicaragua and Philippines and import-substitution in Iran, they all managed to serve the interest of the few elites rather than the majority of the population. In all cases, state intervention led to initial economic growth followed by economic decline and great inequality exacerbated by dependency on the world market (p26). The high interventionist approach of the state with low class conflict made it the sole target of attack resulting in a social revolution in Iran and Nicaragua, and the low interventionist approach with more class conflict made both the state and the capitalist elites the target of attack and resulted in a political revolution in the Philippines (p287).
The role of ideology in the outcome of revolutions
Perhaps the role of ideology in revolutions has been overplayed by some social theorists, especially in the case of Iran (Parsa, p8-9). For ideologies are not independent agents that come into play without the socio-political structures, collective actions and variety of other factors that give rise to them (p288-9). Therefore even extreme and relatively widespread ideologies are not effective revolutionary causes by themselves. Although, some ideology might always be involved as a partial force behind group actions, there are no monolithic and uniform ideologies across a society and no one single ideology behind all the opposition groups, which have to come together for revolutionary movements to succeed. In all three countries analyzed here, different groups and classes with different views and ideologies joined forces for a common goal of changing the regime.
A number of authors on Iranian revolution point to the process of “rapid westernization” as a determining factor in the revolutionary movement (Crabb: p1069, 1079). Some attribute a prevailing ideological significance to the development of the revolutionary movement in Iran as well as “fear of foreign influences” and “anti-westernization” sentiments. (Moshiri: p1, 31-33) In many people’s minds after the coup, Shah came to be perceived as an agent of western imperialism. In the concomitant of declining economic conditions, rise of poverty and inequality in a climate of repression and militarization, the voice of Khomeini’s anti-monarchy and anti-westernization gave fuel to the revolutionary fervor (at the right time). And though the support for Khomeini has often been interpreted as ideological, a contrary evidence to that view has been the fact that Khomeini’s religious ideology and theocratic ideals were unknown to the majority of people as he did not explicate his Islamic fundamentalist views to the public, but focused his attacks on the Shah’s dictatorship and imperialistic ambitions, while promising freedom and independence and presenting Islam as the friend and supporter of the poor and the destitute and building on the socialists and Marxist ideals of egalitarian society. However, he did enjoy popularity due to his relentless and outspoken opposition against the Shah, which he demonstrated since the early 1960s and deftly managed to fill the gap as the charismatic leader of the revolution by capitalizing on the opportunities and uprisings that were taking place at the time. He continued to send many messages to the people in Iran from his exile in France, exposing the tyranny and dictatorship of the Shah and expressing concern for the poor and the downtrodden, and calling for freedom, independence and social justice (Parsa, p248). His unrelenting and continuous anti-Shah and anti-western rhetoric fueled the fires of discontent. Khomeini, a long time and most formidable opponent of the Shah called the clergy and other opposition groups into action and played on the atmosphere of discontent and rising fervor (p290-1) But in order to install his brand of the Islamic regime, he had to implement a high and unexpectedly shocking degree of violence and repression right after the overthrow by taking advantage of the chaos and instability in the country and his severe method of repression revealed oppositions and lack of support for his brand of Islamic theocracy (p291). And although Islamic socialism was a present ideology among the students and some other groups, it was not the main reason of support for Khomeini. The most ideological group, the students, did not support Khomeini until the end as a matter of political expediency (p290).
Perhaps the biggest reason that ideology was not the main force behind revolutions is evident from the fact that different groups joined the struggle and the revolutionary movement for different reasons and at different times, but united for a common objective of overthrowing the regime rather than shared ideology. According to Misagh Parsa, ideologies are not divorced from their existing social and historical background that bring them into existence and give rise to them, and the ideological explanation of the revolution in Iran as expressed by some social theorists reveals a tautology that bases the cause on the outcome and end result of the revolution, in this case taking the establishment of an Islamic regime to be due to the Islamic ideology as its cause (p9, 288). One other counter-argument for the ideological basis of the revolution in Iran is the fact that Iran was largely a secular country prior to the revolution. (p136-8) Perhaps it’s also important to note that even within an Islamic group, there are different ideologies and not all Islamic clerics believe in theocracy as imposed by Khomeini. Therefore some examples and evidence to present the ideological basis of the revolution are in fact misinterpretation of the facts. For example, as repression escalated, mosques became the main venues for mobilization, not for religious reasons, but as the only option available, which helped expand and consolidate the power of the clerics (p138, p290-1). So in this way, taking the actions on face value, out of its real social context misses the cause behind them that were necessitated by the circumstances at the time.
On the other hand, ideology is the most prevalent force behind student oppositions, which are usually the first revolutionary contenders advocating a total revolution that results in a transformation of societal structure toward a more egalitarian ideal and who share a natural alliance with dissident intellectuals (p96, p127-9). And due to their active and visible role in revolutionary movement, they often bore the brunt of the violence (p129). However, though active, being a minority in major cities, they often do not have a major impact and could not disrupt social organizations through strikes without holding jobs or having strong coalitions to the working class. And though an important part of the revolutionary trend, in cases where their radical ideology brought about social conflict, it prevented coalitions with others and workers in Nicaragua and Philippines in 1970s (96). The main ideology of the students in the three countries were socialists and Marxists and in the case of Iran, Islamic ideology as well. They opposed US support of the despotic regimes, exclusive rule and centralization of power, inequalities and social injustice, and mainly held socialist and Marxist ideologies and sympathies (p128). Iranian students were more repressed, divided between Islamic and secular ideological groups, and did not benefit from organizational capabilities; in comparison, the students in Philippines and Nicaragua were better able to mobilize due to less repression (p127-8). In Philippines, due to the prior democratic structures, the students were more moderate, but eventually became radicalized in response to repression and government’s shift away from democracy which prevented coalition building, the opposite of what happened in Nicaragua and Iran, where they joined forces at the end with the main opposition groups in the removal of the regimes in 1979. In Nicaragua and Philippines, students joined the labor organizations, whereas in Iran they had little ties to the workers. And in the end, only in Nicaragua, did students play an effective role in aiding FSLN to succeed (p128-9).
In Iran, bazaaries were negatively affected by market intervention of the state and joined the clerics mostly for political expediency and revolutionary goals rather than ideology (p234). In Nicaragua, despite conflicts of ideology of the FSLN and the bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie gave their support to Sandinistas at the end. They joined them because of rampant corruption and underdevelopment, hoping for a democratic system to take its place. (Paige, p117, P120-1) “The revolution made the bourgeoisie radical.” (p124) There was simply no alternative to the absolutist regime and dictatorship of Somoza. In Philippines, the capitalists felt most threatened by the communists and relied on the state for protection, and despite their reluctance, in the end, they ended up playing a significant role in the outcome, which was a political rather than a social revolution (Parsa, p233-5).
In all three countries, the ideological moderates were in the majority and the radical ideological revolutionaries a minority, with ideological differences and divergences. Regardless of whatever the ideologies might have been present among the various factions and groups, it was not the main force that brought about the necessary coalitions together in these revolutions, as often they were not publicly and largely known, declared or shared (Parsa, p132, 288). So ideologies, though added fuel to the fire, were not the main engine of the revolution.
References
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Gheissari, Ali and Vali Nasr. Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty. Oxford University Press. 2006.
Halliday, Fred. “Iran’s Revolution in Global History.” OpenDemocracy. March 5, 2009. Retrieved from http://www.opendemocracy.net/node/47428/pdf
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Paige, Jeffrey. Coffee and Power: Revolution and the Rise of Democracy in Central America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997.
Parsa, Misagh. States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran, Nicaragua, and The Philippines. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Thompson, Mark. The Anti-Marcos Struggle. Yale University Press. 1995.
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Film:
ABC News: The Revolution: Live From Tehran
BBC: Iran: A Revolution Betrayed
BBC: To Sing Our Own Song. 1982