The identity theory as posited by Smart claims that mental state types (M) are identical to brain state types (B), so M = B. The examples often used include scientific identity claims such as water = H20 and heat = molecular motion as well as pain = “C-fibers firing. “ The two versions of this theory are type identity claims because they equate a type of mental event or state with a type of brain process and the token identity claims that involve a very specific instance of the events or processes. For example a token identity of pain identifies a certain specific neural patterns of the brain with a very specific kind of pain.
There are a number of objections to this theory that Smart anticipates and tries to answer. Some objections point to the fact that these phenomena have been experienced and referred to long before any a posteriori and empirical knowledge of their physical and scientific composition were available, e.g., lightning being an electric discharge, and that the identities of these claim can well be contingent relative to scientific progress. Smart responds by making a distinction between the scientific nature of something and its sensory experience as well as saying that we are only referring to different features of the same thing and that when we talk of the physical or mental properties of something we may mean two different things, but in fact to refer to the same thing, so the meaning of the words or properties might be different, but the referent is the same. The strongest objection (#3) to which Smart admits to not having a complete and satisfactory answer, emphasizes the quality aspect of our experiences beyond the brain processes to which Smart proposes the concept of topic neutrality. Topic neutrality refers to the way we talk about experiencing phenomena without explicitly expressing and committing to any views about physical and mental aspects of an experience, except to basically say that we’re experiencing a phenomenon that we’ve experienced before without expressing any definite knowledge of its source or nature. [Chalmers, 60-68]
Kripke’s argument against the identity theory
The basic premise of Kripke’s argument involves the concept of “rigid designators” in that any identity claim or statement that involves rigid designators, if true, is necessarily so. So if we take M and B to be rigid designators, the statement that M = B, has to be a necessarily true statement. There are several components to Kripke’s argument, one is the concept of rigid designators, the other is the distinction between scientific and mental phenomena and essential and non-essential features and characteristics of things. Rigid designators include proper names and “natural kind” entities such as water, clouds and pain and have the same referent in all possible worlds in which they exist. That means in all the possible worlds where we might find water, it is composed of H20. However, it may seem to many of us that it is perfectly possible for water not to be H20, heat not to be molecular motion or pain not to be C-fibers firing in some other world, which makes them appear contingent. The argument asserts that if we cannot explain these contingencies as illusions, the identity claim is false. Now the way to determine the contingencies brings into play the concept of essential and non-essential features. And as we will see the contingencies can be explained as illusory in the case of water and heat, but not in the case of pain. So, the contingency that water might not have been H20 is false, because even though water might not be experienced as watery or have the appearance that we associate with water, the necessary and essential property of water is its molecular structure, namely H20, and not it is transparency and fluidity. This is true of scientific properties that are considered to be necessary and non-contingent, where appearances seem to be contingent. And in the case of heat even when we can imagine that molecular motion might not have been heat, that is due to the contingency of the way “heat” is experienced by us as the feeling and senation of heat, which is separate from the physical phenomenon produced by molecular motion. We could see how the sensation of heat could be due to some other physical phenomenon or how some creatures may not experience it by missing the sensory appropriate receptors or perhaps experience another sensation instead. So the “heat” that can be absent is the sensation or experience of heat as we perceive it, but we need to separate the appearance and sensory experience of things from their essential features and properties.
However, pain is not analogous to such scientific identification because the phenomenon of pain is the experience of it. And although in cases of heat and water, the contingencies were merely illusions that we could explain, we cannot do the same for pain. When we can easily see the possibility of pain being present without the neural activity of C-fibers and vice versa, the apparent contingency cannot be an illusion and if the contingency is true the identity claim has to be false.
This is because for pain, the perception and experience of it, is its very existence, its essential feature and what makes it pain. We can’t make the feeling of being in pain or being hurt contingent to what pain is. We cannot say that pain might not be the feeling of being hurt as we do with heat that it might not have been the warmth that we feel so the contingency cannot be dismissed.
The lack of feeling or perceiving pain is the lack of its existence. You cannot say that your brain scan shows the activation of C-fibers so you must be in pain, when the person is not experiencing any pain, in other words, you are not having pain because by virtue of not feeling or experiencing pain, no matter what the neurons in your brain show. Therefore pain = cfibers firing cannot be true and the identity theory is false.
Christopher Hills analysis of Kripke’s argument is that it appears that pain might be present without the C-fibers firing and the C-fibers might fire without pain being present, and these two things appear separate and distinct and there is one way to explain this appearance of separateness, which cannot be used for pain, so pain is distinct from C-fiber stimulation. [Chalmers, 334-341] He then tries to explain away some of these seeming contingencies by describing the different imaginations that we employ such as “perceptual imagination” for brain and physical states and “sympathetic imagination” for mental states as presented by Nagel. These different types of imagination used in imagining physical or mental states are supposed to explain why M and B seem separate and contingent to us. [Chalmers, 329-332]
I don’t see that we use distinct and separate modes of imaginations in as much as different ways of using the imagination, based on the object of our focus and their qualitative differences. For example, because we have no direct experience with our brain states, our imagination can only work through visualization and intellectual knowledge and be somewhat removed, whereas because of other direct experiences with phenomenon such as pain, the way we can put ourselves in that position is different, which makes the quality and depth of that imagination distinct. It’s the same imagination, except that in the former case, it is removed and limited due to the lack of direct experience. I don’t see this as a direct reflection on the apparent contingencies, but only a conceptual distinction in the way imagination is used. Our imagination faculty is used differently for imaging different things, just as our intellect is used differently, which we do not separate based on the objects of our cognition. Just because we may use our imagination faculties differently to imagine very different states, one of which we have a direct experience with and the other not at all, except conceptually and visually perhaps does not mean that there are different types of imaginations per se. It’s not like we say, let me see which mode of my imagination I’m going to use here. Imagination merely uses all the sensory and internal means it has at its disposal. It may be limited or tailored to the object of its focus depending on our experience with it. So where I see the difference is in the objects of imagination and not its modes.
And although, I don’t argue that our imaginations allows us to separate anything from their properties, this still does not to seem have any direct bearing on what the necessary property of something might be.
Functionalism
Another theory that tries to explain the mind-body problem is functionalism. Functionalism identifies mental states as functional states (M = F) and equates them with the roles and functions they play as determined by their causes and effects. Armstrong identifies mental states with their causal roles and Lewis define them as the role they play in terms of their “typical” causes and effects. So pain would be identified as whatever fills and plays the role of pain.
In the example that Lewis uses to lay out a version of functionalism, there are two very different types of pain experienced by a mad man and a Martian. The mad man who is a human like us with the same neural wiring and structural mechanism experiences “pain” or rather the neural activation of pain by exercising on an empty stomach which helps him focus better on mathematics and has no propensity to avoid the “pain” in any way. And the Martian whose neural wiring and body mechanism bears no resemblance to ours, responds to a typical stimulus such as being pinched which inflates cavities in his feet and shows typical avoidance symptoms. So the mad main has the same neural processes as a “normal” person, but atypical cause and effects, which seems to counteract the argument for functionalism and the Martian shows the same functional role for pain as in humans in terms of its cause and effect yet without any C-fibers stimulation, which it seems to counteract the identity theory.
How can the mad man be in pain when the state he is in does not fill the same typical causal role of pain as defined by functionalism? Here Lewis introduces the idea of “appropriate population” and defines the mad man as an exception since it doesn’t seem to fit in any population that make it work to support the theory. So pain is defined as whatever fills the role of pain for the appropriate population and the choices he gives for appropriate populations are human species, where X is a member, where X is unexceptional, and the natural population. How do we determine an appropriate population? This is where things get complicated. X may belong to more than one population and depending on the population; it may not be in the way that the identity theory and functionalism define as pain. So can we say that the Martians can’t experience pain by virtue of not having neurons and the mad man doesn’t experience pain because for him pain doesn’t occupy the same causal role?
The problems resulting from injuries to viagra generico cipla the back range from something as complex as a herniated disc to something as simple as a nerve damage. The only thing responsible for this is that Google usually carries out recommended levitra 20 mg their own authenticity checks which places legitimate websites at the beginning of the search engine’s results. As a result the penile tissue is relaxed and the blood vessels allow passage of more blood through penis then you are likely to buy cheapest cialis experience a bigger penis than usual. Mechanical responses are the physical effects that occur in the body and reaches maximum concentration within cialis tablets uk 2 hours. Lewis thinks that ideally a good theory of mind has to account for both states and cases and wants to avoid a disjunctive compromise. Yet neither view seems to account for both cases. He does concede, however, that both the madman and the Martian may not experience the pain as we do, which points to the importance of what we consider the essential properties of pain to be. Just because the Martian may act the way we do when in pain, doesn’t mean that he is in fact experiencing pain internally, which shows that mere action and reaction do not seem sufficient. And just because the mad man has the same neural basis associated as us when in pain, does not mean the feeling of pain is present and that he is experiencing pain as identity theory would have us believe. So it seems both theories leave out the aspect of what pain feels like, which is what Kripke would call its essential property. [Lewis, 229-233]
Other objections to functionalism
According to Ned Block, functionalism runs the danger of being too liberal or chauvinistic, i.e., too broad or too limited. In the former case anything may be said to have a mind and functions as a mind and in the latter case, only creatures that have neurons or brain like us can be said to have mind. This seems to be a valid argument as many things may have similar functions that could not be more different. There seems to be a conflation between of analogy with identity. One main argument against functionalism (as it is against physicalism in general) is the issue of qualia and how to account for feelings, which Blocks refers to as “Absent Qualia Argument.” [97]
Another objection to functionalism is illustrated by John Searle’s example of the Chinese Room. Where perfect synchronization of input and output has been achieved without the meaning and understanding of the process, showing that a perfect machine like brain does not a mind make. Perhaps we should ask, can we define a mind as functional if it’s missing intelligence and consciousness? [Chalmers, 94-99]
Kripke’s argument against functionalism
Kripke’s modal argument against functionalism may or may not hold against functionalism depending on whether or not we can apply rigid designation to the causal roles. Lewis thinks that pain is a non-rigid concept and state, and in anticipation of an objection admits that pain is in fact a feeling and that it would be a mistake to ignore the way it feels, i.e., that is feeling it is the same as having it, but the theory he supports does not seem to make room for that.
Kripke considers pain to be a rigid designator, but it is a harder task to determine the rigidity of the causal roles as they are not easily determinable. Which causes and effects can we take to be essential features? We see that the causes and effects of mental states such as pain can vary and the variety of atypical causes can invalidate the case for exceptions as the contingency of what constitutes pain in terms of its causes and effects becomes more and more likely and perhaps common. So it seems that the argument does hold against functionalism as well. But even if we could do away with rigid designation somehow, functionalism seems to be another incomplete theory that only looks at one associated part or aspect of the state and experience to be the whole mental state, that is identifies a part as the whole. As a theory in general, it does not consider the qualitative feature of mental states as we’ve seen argued by Block. But at the root of Kripke’s objection apart from the structural modality of his argument is that pain cannot be identical to something that does not feel like pain. This is what both theories completely miss. What Armstrong calls the problem of secondary qualities and what Lewis says is important, is the problem for all purely physicalistic theories.
Some issues with functionalism include the following. Since there happens to be a long chain of causation, it is hard to determine the exact causes and effects that make up a mental state, in other words to locate it. So one difficulty would be knowing where to draw the line in the chain as one mental state can lead to another (not all are as obvious or straightforward as pain might appear), but a belief can lead to a thought which can lead to a desire that may never take form. So how do we define M in terms of its cause and effect when it’s immediate cause and effect is yet another M? One may go through a series of thoughts and emotions without acting on them or any observable or behavioral output, and perhaps may unexpectedly experience a thought or emotion that seems to have no apparent cause consciously. At what level do we determine and isolate the state, the physical damage to the body, response of the pain receptors or the response of the body as a whole? There are also many causes and effects that are not considered typical. How do we ascertain something as atypical? If we have a belief that happens to be false yet prompts us to react a certain way, is that an atypical cause and state? It is not clear why we should exclude atypical causes and what we determine as atypical. Where do intentions that don’t materialize in any way come into play? A mental state might produce simultaneous effects such as thoughts, emotions and actions on many levels and in many directions. It’s not a linear process. And there might be conflicting causes and emotions. A hammer might be created specifically for a certain role, but who is to say what the role of a thought or emotion is or would be?
If we imagine someone being pinched while he was sleeping, the pain or the state of the pinch might make him shirk or withdraw by automatic response, they might respond exactly the same way that they do physically (with the brain’s neural activity) as if they were awake and found themselves in the receiving end of that pinch, yet the person sleeping is not consciously experiencing the uncomfortable feeling or the pain of that pinch and missing the associated mental state. And if we ask him to recall the experience and he is unable to do so, can we say then that the feeling or experience of pain existed at that moment? Or let’s say someone who has chronic pain of some kind undergoes some medical or psychological intervention, and for a time seems to be missing the conscious experience of the pain, even when their brain scan shows C-fibers activation. Can we say that they are actually going through pain at the moment when there is no conscious awareness of it?
Functionalism seems more plausible than epiphenomenalism as it allows for the efficacy of the mental states. But it is vague in terms of where in the seemingly endless causal chain we can find that state. It also reduces the mind to merely a mechanical process. Feelings and qualia generally cannot be reduced to something else since the very way they feel and are experienced make them what they are. They are part of a unique class that are not reducible entities, but basic to human experience. You can not explain a feeling by making it something other than what it is – a feeling. Just because, for every mental state there might be a corresponding brain state, it does not follow that they are the same thing just as similar functionalities do not make things identical.
References
Chalmers, David J. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford University Press, NY, 2002, 281-294.
Lewis, David. “Mad Pain and Martian Pain.” Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Harvard University Press. 1980, Vol. I, p229-233. Retrieved from: http://www.usfca.edu/philosophy/pdf%20files/Mad%20Pain%20and%20Martian%20Pain.pdf